Tax Amnesty, A Determinant of Increasing the Degree of Voluntary Compliance in Paying Taxes and Taxes and Reducing Tax Evasion

Author's Information:

Marian-Romeo Guiu 

Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iași, Romania

Vol 03 No 06 (2026):Volume 03 Issue 06 June 2026

Page No.: 402-409

Abstract:

Romanian policymakers have repeatedly resorted to tax amnesties and concessions, pursuing a dual objective: the rapid generation of budgetary revenues and the cancellation of tax receivables considered irrecoverable, but although this type of fiscal intervention can be characterized as a strategy to combat tax evasion, from the perspective of the behavior of honest taxpayers who have honored their tax contributions on time, this amnesty can generate a feeling of frustration. Since the latter ask themselves the question "what is the point of paying my tax obligations on time while other bad taxpayers benefit from a favorable tax treatment".

Taken as a whole, this phenomenon of tax concession analyzed for a consistent period of time, can highlight a negative effect on the fiscal behavior of taxpayers, confirming the conclusion highlighted by the specialized literature according to which tax amnesties applied without complementary measures to strengthen compliance can have counterproductive effects. The lack of firm actions to control and sanction tax evasion reduces the long-term effectiveness of the amnesty and encourages the persistence of non-compliance behaviors.

KeyWords:

Tax Amnesty, Tax Compliance, Tax Evasion, Voluntary Tax Compliance, Fiscal Policy

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