Tax Rules, Voluntary Compliance and Evasion: Between Power, Trust and Budget Sustainability

Author's Information:

Marian-Romeo Guiu

Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iași, Iași, Romania

Vol 02 No 09 (2025):Volume 02 Issue 09 September 2025

Page No.: 554-559

Abstract:

The article examines the phenomenon of tax evasion in Romania, compared to the member states of the European Union, focusing on behavioral determinants: trust in authorities, coercive power, tax knowledge, attitudes and social norms. The role of digitalization in Romania, the impact of VAT and the structure of tax revenues are analyzed. The results show that reducing the tax gap requires an integrated strategy that combines digitalization, institutional reform and strengthening taxpayer trust. Tax compliance is a complex process, influenced by the interaction between institutional, psychological and social factors. The reduced rates applied by the Romanian state for certain goods and services generate a negative distributive impact, influencing the consumption decisions and tax behavior of taxpayers. Increasing tax revenues as a share of GDP can be achieved through more efficient tax administration, reducing the VAT gap and stimulating voluntary compliance, supported by tax assistance and collection measures. Studies show that most taxpayers are willing to pay taxes, which highlights the need for tax policies based on trust, predictability and balance in tax levels.

KeyWords:

tax compliance, tax evasion, fairness, power of authorities, Romania, European Union

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